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CAN SUPERSTARS REALLY SING THE BLUES?
AN ARGUMENT FOR THE ADOPTION OF AN UNDUE
HARDSHIP STANDARD WHEN CONSIDERING
REJECTION OF EXECUTORY PERSONAL SERVICES
CONTRACTS IN BANKRUPTCY
INTRODUCTION
Four young musicians, hoping to become R&B/Hip Hop
stars, formed a musical group called BeYon DaMeens
("BYDM").' Looking for their first break, BYDM arranged to
perform for small audiences at a local bar every week. One
night, a talent scout from a small independent record company
went to the bar and heard BYDM playing. The scout saw po-
tential in the young group and returned to hear them several
more times. Thinking these artists might appeal to a large
audience, the scout offered BYDM a long-term recording con-
tract. Under the contract, BYDM was required to record one
album for the record company in exchange for advances and
royalty payments,2 with the record company having the option
to extend the contract for six additional albums.' The band
members, anxious to start their recording careers, signed the
contract, received their initial advance, and began working on
their first album.
During the next eighteen months, the record company
spent a great deal of time and money to develop the skill, look
and sound of BYDM in order to convert BYDM from a local bar
band to one capable of achieving national prominence. In antic-
' The facts presented in this introduction are fictional. No actual person or
group is intended to be depicted.
2 Typically a recording agreement provides that, in exchange for recorded
albums, the record company will pay to the artist advances against royalties to be
earned from the artist's albums. DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL You NEED To KroW
ABOUT THE Music BusiNEss 100-02 (1994).
' Typically a record company will commit to only one or two albums when the
contract is signed, but will reserve the right (the option) to require additional al-
bums. New artists are typically required to record up to nine albums. More es-
tablished artists, however, may usually contract for only up to six albums. Id. at
117-18.
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ipation of the release of BYDM's debut album, the record com-
pany vigorously promoted and marketed the group. The record
company secured spots on music television shows where BYDM
would both perform and be interviewed, arranged for BYDM to
appear with the well-known and established artists on its
roster, and distributed promotional copies of the upcoming
album to radio stations nationwide for immediate air time.
Upon the release of BYDM's debut album, LIVIN" THE HI
LIFE, the group received critical acclaim. Within a few weeks,
the album reached the number one spot on the charts in Re-
cord 'Em, a worldwide music trade magazine. Hoping to pro-
long the album's success, the record company scheduled an
international concert tour with interviews on both radio and
television programs in major cities around the world. Excited
by their new-found fame, the individual members of BYDM
lived the lavish lifestyles of recording superstars. While on
tour, BYDM insisted on staying in four star hotel suites and
eating in world class restaurants-essentially living their
dream lives. In addition, the individual members of BYDM
began making purchases so they could each maintain the su-
perstar lifestyle once the tour ended. To ensure BYDM's happi-
ness and success, the record company voluntarily advanced
substantial amounts of money, beyond that required under the
recording contract. The record company then exercised its
option for a second album and while the group was on tour,
preparations for this album began.
BYDM's second album, GOIN' F'BROKE, was released
eighteen months after the release of the debut album and was
even more successful. This album opened at the number one
spot on the charts in Record 'Em and remained there for
twelve weeks. In addition, each single release from the album
achieved top positions on the Record 'Em-Singles chart. Within
weeks after this release, fans were screaming for another con-
cert tour, and television shows and radio stations were re-
questing second and third interviews with the band. The mem-
bers of BYDM were now considered superstars4 throughout
the world.
' Generally an artist is deemed a "superstar" when an album achieves sales of
over 750,000 units. Id. at 108.
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Although BYDMs albums sold very well, the individual
members did not make as much money as they had anticipat-
ed, and because they lived the superstar lifestyle, they quickly
acquired substantial debt. After speaking with friends and
other recording artists, the group learned that other recording
stars had more favorable recording contracts. BYDM ap-
proached their record company to renegotiate their contract
and requested a very large advance. Executives at the record
company, aware of the fleeting nature of success and the sub-
stantial unrecouped balance attributable to past voluntary
advances, offered only an advance sufficient to provide enough
cash to cover the band's current debts. BYDM rejected this
proposal and negotiations ceased.
Each of the individual members of BYDM then filed bank-
ruptcy petitions seeking relief under chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code ("Code"). Ten days later, each member, claiming
that the recording contract was burdensome and limited her
business opportunities, filed a motion to reject the recording
contract under section 365 of the Code.' After the bankruptcy,
assuming their contract is rejected, BYDM intends to sell their
songwriting and performance abilities to the highest bidder.
The above hypothetical illustrates a matter of growing
concern in the entertainment industry. Successful recording
artists bound by long-term contracts executed at the start of
their careers recognize that if they were free to deal on the
open market, they would almost certainly make more money.
If a record company and artist cannot come to terms in a rene-
gotiation, the artist may seek to reject her contract in bank-
ruptcy with little or no redress for the record company. Al-
though bankruptcy courts generally will not permit a bank-
ruptcy case to continue where the debtor' files for relief solely
to reject a valid contract in order to enter into a more profit-
able one,7 a debtor can easily assert other grounds in support
of her claim.
5 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1996). Under section 365, certain contracts to which the
debtor is a party as of the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition may, sub-
ject to court approval, be assumed or rejected. See infra notes 32-99 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of section 365.
6 A "debtor" is defined in the Code as a 'person or municipality concerning
which a [bankruptcy] case ... has been commenced." 11 U.S.C. § 101(13) (1996).
' See infra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
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The current rules relating to rejection of executory' per-
sonal services contracts9 in bankruptcy are inequitable and
create an incentive for people such as the members of BYDM
to use the bankruptcy courts to escape contractual obligations
willingly assumed at the start of their careers. A person bound
to an executory personal services contract may, with virtually
no obstacles, obtain the "protection" of bankruptcy to reject the
contract and avoid all contractual obligations. Further, even
where a person seeks contract rejection for reasons other than
to enter into a more profitable contract, gross inequities may
result; either there may be insufficient relief available to the
non-debtor party to the contract, or the debtor may not receive
the protection that bankruptcy is supposed to offer.'0
This Note argues for the adoption of an equitable standard
to determine when rejection of executory personal services
contracts under section 365 is appropriate. Part I of this Note
briefly discusses the purpose of bankruptcy protection and
explains certain statutory requirements of chapters 7 and 11
and section 365 of the Code. Part I also demonstrates that a
recording contract can almost always be rejected at the sole
option of the debtor which results in inadequate redress to the
non-debtor party to the contract, a failure to adequately protect
the debtor, or both. Part II analyzes the options currently
available to the non-debtor party to prevent rejection and illus-
trates that rejection is generally inevitable even where such
rejection will result in gross inequity. Part III offers a solution
that equitably balances the interests of the debtor and non-
debtor parties to executory personal services contracts through
the adoption of an undue hardship standard to determine
when contract rejection is appropriate.
8 Under section 365 of the Code, only executory contracts and unexpired leases
may be assumed or rejected. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1996). This Note does not address
the treatment of unexpired leases in bankruptcy. See infra notes 38-58 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the meaning of "executory."
9 A recording contract is a type of personal services contract. See, e.g., Delight-
ful Music Ltd. v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 913 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1990); Ferrell v.
Robinson Mann Creative Enters., Inc., 211 B.R. 183 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997); In re
Noonan, 17 B.R. 793 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
10 See infra notes 11-19 and accompanying text.
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I. BANKRUPTCY PROTECTION AND THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
A. A General Overview
The Code allows a person11 with outstanding debt' to
seek relief from creditors' in bankruptcy court."' The pur-
pose of bankruptcy is twofold: it affords creditors an opportu-
nity to recover a portion of their outstanding claims in a con-
trolled and monitored setting, while allowing a debtor to seek
refuge in court and obtain a "fresh start," free from financial
difficulties.'5 That a debtor has any "rights" in bankruptcy is
a relatively new concept. 6 Early bankruptcy law existed pri-
marily for the benefit of creditors. Not only were creditors enti-
tled to the debtor's assets, but the creditors were entitled to
imprison the debtor until the balance of debts were paid.' As
bankruptcy law developed, it became increasingly more sympa-
thetic to the "honest" debtor who, because of poor management
skills or simply bad luck, could not pay his bills." Today, it is
well established that bankruptcy, under appropriate circum-
stances, provides relief to both the creditors and the debtor. 9
A bankruptcy case commences when a debtor files a peti-
tion in bankruptcy court under a specific chapter of the
Code.2' The filing of a bankruptcy petition creates a barrier
" A "person" is defined in the Code as an individual, partnership or corpora-
tion. 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (1996).
1 "Debt" is defined in the Code as a "liability on a claim." 11 US.C. § 101(12)
(1996).
"A "creditor" is defined in the Code as an 'entity that has a claim [for a
right to payment or a right to an equitable remedy] against the debtor." 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(10)(A) (1996).
14 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1996). Although section 109 does not specifically require
that a debtor have debts prior to seeking relief in bankruptcy court, it has been
established that a person in bankruptcy must have debts owing. See, eg., Connell
v. Coastal Cable T.V., Inc. (In re Coastal Cable T.V., Inc.), 709 F.2d 762 (1st Cir.
1983) (debtor does not have to be insolvent but has to at least have debts).
15 1 DAVID A. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUFrPY § 1-2, at 2-3 (1992).
16 Id. § 1-1, at 1-2.
17 I& § 1-1, at 2 (citing Max Radin, The Nature of Bankruptcy, 89 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 3-4 (1940)).
"Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHL L. REV. 775, 785-89 (1987).
Id. See also EPSTEIN, supra note 15, § 1-2, at 2-3.
20 11 U.S.C: § 301 (1996). There are five kinds of bankruptcy cases under the
Code: (1) chapter 7 involves liquidation of a debtor's assets; 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)
(1996); (2) chapter 9 governs cases where the debtor is a government entity; 11
U.S.C. § 109(c) (1996); (3) chapter 11 focuses on reorganization rather than liqui-
1997]
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between a debtor and her creditors." In general, a creditor's
collection efforts must take place during the bankruptcy so
that all creditors can share in the debtor's assets in accordance
with the nature of the debt owed.22 In addition, the filing of a
bankruptcy petition creates a bankruptcy estate. With certain
exceptions, all property owned by the debtor at the time she
files her petition becomes "property of the estate."23 A disin-
terested person called a "trustee" is then appointed by the
court to manage the property of the estate throughout the
bankruptcy.2
Chapter 7 of the Code, entitled "Liquidation," focuses on
the liquidation of the property of the estate and the distribu-
tion of the proceeds to the debtor's creditors.' In a chapter 7
case, the trustee is responsible for converting all nonexempt
property of the estate to cash which is then distributed to the
debtor's creditors. 26 Chapter 11 of the Code, entitled "Reorga-
nization," focuses on the reorganization of the property of the
estate.27 Instead of being liquidated, the debtor's assets are
restructured pursuant to a reorganization plan.28 Because
dation of the debtor's property, 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (1996); (4) chapter 12 is limited
to family farmer law; 11 U.S.C. § 109(f) (1996); and (5) chapter 13 governs indi-
vidual repayment plans. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1996). Subject to certain restrictions,
bankruptcy petitions may be voluntary, involuntary or joint. A voluntary case is
commenced by a debtor filing a petition under any operative chapter under which
she wants to proceed. 11 U.S.C. § 301. An involuntary case may only be filed
under chapters 7 and 11. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1996). A joint case is voluntary and
involves a debtor and a spouse, where the husband and wife are jointly responsi-
ble for debts. 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1996). This Note discusses only voluntary bank-
ruptcy petitions filed under chapters 7 and 11.
21 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1996). Section 362, entitled Automatic stay, is designed to
stop creditor harassment, affording a debtor relief from financial obligations and,
in chapter 11, an opportunity to form a reorganization plan. See infra note 28 and
accompanying text.
' Id, Secured creditors are generally paid first, and then the unsecured credi-
tors are paid in accordance with the priority of their claims. 11 U.S.C. §§ 725,
506, 507 (1996).
2 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1996).
21 11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702, 703, 1104 (1996). In a case under chapter 11, how-
ever, a trustee is rarely appointed. See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
' See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (1996).
26 11 U.S.C. § 704.
' See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1996).
26 11 U.S.C. § 1123. The debtor has 120 days from the initial date of the
bankruptcy petition to file a reorganization plan which must be confirmed by the
court. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121(a), (b), 1129. If the debtor does not file a reorganization
plan within such time, or if the court rejects the proposed reorganization plan, any
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chapter 11 cases generally involve businesses that continue
operating after the bankruptcy petition is filed,' the Code
allows a chapter 11 debtor to remain in control of her assets as
a "debtor in possession."0 Generally, a trustee will not be
appointed in a chapter 11 case unless the bankruptcy court
finds that the debtor has or will fraudulently manage her as-
sets.31
B. Section 365: Rejection and Assumption of Executory
Contracts
Section 365 of the Code governs the treatment of executory
contracts to which the debtor is a party as of the date of the
commencement of the bankruptcy filing, regardless of whether
the case is filed under chapter 7 or 11." Under section 365, a
trustee' may, subject to court approval and subject to certain
exceptions," reject or assume any executory contract to which
the debtor is a party as of the date of the bankruptcy filing.'
However, assumption of personal services contracts by a trust-
ee without the debtor's consent is expressly prohibited in the
Code. 6 Thus, under section 365, wher a debtor seeks rejec-
tion of her personal services contract, rejection is the only
option. As only executory contracts are subject to rejection in
bankruptcy, as a threshold matter it must be determined
interested party, including a creditor, may file a reorganization plan. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1121(b), (c).
It is not a requirement, however, that a chapter 11 debtor have a business.
11 U.S.C. § 109(a), (d) (1996). See also Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991).
s 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101(1), 1107. The Code mandates that a debtor in possession
perform the same functions as a trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 1107.
3, 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1996). Rejection of executory collective bargaining agree-
ments, however, is governed by 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1996). See infra note 90 and
accompanying text.
All references in this Note to 'trustee" shall refer to both a trustee and
debtor in possession, as applicable.
Where applicable law excuses a party from accepting performance, the con-
tract may not be assumed. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(2)(A)(i) (1996).
11 U.S.C. § 365 (1996).
3' The Code states that: "The trustee may not assume or assign an executory
contract... of the debtor... if applicable law excuses a party, other than the
debtor, to such contract... from accepting performance from or rendering perfor-
mance to an entity other than the debtor... and such party does not consent to
such assumption . .. ." 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(A), (B) (1996).
1997]
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whether recording contracts such as the one described in the
hypothetical above are executory.37
1. A Recording Contract is Generally Deemed Executory
When Considering Whether Rejection is Available
Under Section 365
Generally, an executory contract is a contract that is not
fully performed.3' The term "executory," however, is not de-
fined in the Code, leaving the question of what amount of
performance due is sufficient to render a contract executory
open to judicial interpretation. One definition of executory was
developed by Professor Countryman in 1973."9 Only a contract
"under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other
party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of
either to complete performance would constitute a material
s' Some courts have found that personal services contracts are excluded from
property of the estate and therefore not subject to rejection or assumption under
section 365 of the Code. See, e.g., In re Carrere, 64 B.R. 156, 158-59 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1986); In re Noonan, 17 B.R. 793, 797-98 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Bofill,
25 B.R. 550 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). These courts argue that, under the Bankrupt-
cy Act of 1898, personal services contracts were not property of the estate, and be-
cause there was no explicit change in the Code deeming personal services con-
tracts property of the estate, these contracts remain excluded. See 4A COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY I 70.22(3) (14th ed. 1978). In addition, section 541(a)(6) of the Code
specifically excludes from property of the estate "earnings from services performed
by an individual debtor after the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6)
(1996). Some courts also argue that because of section 541(a)(6), personal services
contracts may not be assumed by the estate and therefore are not subject to rejec-
tion either. See, e.g., Noonan, 17 B.R. at 797-98; Bofill, 25 B.R. at 552.
Under the prevailing view, the issue of whether a personal services contract
is property of the estate is not as relevant. See, e.g., Delightful Music Ltd. v.
Taylor (In re Taylor), 913 F.2d 102, 106-07 (3d Cir. 1990); All Blacks B.V. v.
Gruntruck, 199 B.R. 970, 973-75 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1996). Pursuant to section
365(c), a trustee may assume (with the approval of the debtor) or reject any exec-
utory contract. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)(B). "It is the trustee's decision (whether to
assume or reject) that determines whether the benefits of an executory contract
will or will not become property of the estate." Taylor, 913 F.2d at 107. "It is
simply a non sequitur to suggest that a trustee may not reject an executory con-
tract because it is not property of the estate." Id.
3 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 570 (5th ed. 1990) ("A contract that has not as yet
been fully completed or performed. A contract the obligation (performance) of
which relates to the future.").
" Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L.
REV. 439, 460 (1973).
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breach excusing the performance of the other" is executory.40
Although Countryman's definition of executory was introduced
five years before the Code was enacted and was not expressly
adopted by Congress, this definition has been adopted by sev-
eral jurisdictions.4'
Other courts have not expressly adopted the Countryman
definition but instead rely on legislative history which indi-
cates that "[though there is no precise definition of what con-
tracts are executory, it generally includes contracts on which
performance remains due to some extent on both sides." In
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,3 the Supreme Court implicitly
rejected Countryman's definition of executory when it deter-
mined that a collective bargaining agreement was an executory
contract and therefore subject to rejection under section 365 of
the Code.' In Bildisco, both the debtor and non-debtor par-
ties to the collective bargaining agreement agreed that the
contract was executory; the Court nonetheless commented on
the definition of executory, thereby implicitly suggesting that
the general language of legislative history is the appropriate
40Id.
"' See, e.g., Griffel v. Murphy (In re Wegner), 839 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir.
1989); Mitchell v. Streets (in re Streets & Beard Farm Partnership), 882 F.2d 233,
235 (7th Cir. 1989); Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re
Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043, 1045-46 (4th Cir. 1985); Sloan v.
Hicks (In re Becknell & Crace Coal Co.), 761 F.2d 319, 322 (6th Cir. 1985); North-
west Airlines, Inc. v. Klinger (In re Knutson), 563 F.2d 916, 917-18 (8th Cir.
1977); In re m Enters., Inc., 163 B.R. 453, 468 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994); In re
Bluman, 125 B.R. 359, 362 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991); In re Chateaugay Corp., 102
B.R. 335, 344-46 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989); Bregman v. Meehan (in re Meehan), 59
B.R. 380, 386 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Game], 45
B.R. 345, 348 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Norquist, 43 B.IR 224, 228 (Banlr.
E.D. Wash. 1984).
However, the Countryman definition has met with some criticism, even in
those jurisdictions in which it has been expressly adopted. See, e.g., Norquist, 43
B.R. at 228 ("[1It is the respectful opinion of this court that the adoption of the
Countryman definition by the Ninth Circuit should be reexamined .... Never-
theless, I feel compelled to examine this case on the premise that the Countryman
definition is controlling upon this Court."). See also Chattanooga Memorial Park v.
Still (In re Jolly), 574 F.2d 349, 351 (6th Cir. 1978).
42 H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 347 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C-4-N. 5963
(emphasis added). See, e.g., NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 US. 513, 522 n.6
(1984); Sloan, 761 F.2d at 322; In re Taylor, 91 B.R. 302, 310-11 (Banr. D.N.J.
1988).
465 U.S. 513 (1984).
" Id. at 522 n.6.
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guidepost with which to determine whether a contract is execu-
tory.4' However, applying either Countryman's definition of
executory or the suggestion of legislative history that a con-
tract is executory if there remains future performance by both
sides, a recording contract will likely be deemed executory and
subject to section 365.
When a recording contract is signed, the record company
will typically pay a sum of money (an advance) to the artist.4
In addition, the record company will typically establish a fund
(the recording fund) from which all costs incurred in
connection with the making of the record are paid.47 The ad-
vances and all amounts paid from the recording fund are re-
coverable (recoupable) by the record company from royalties
generated by sales of the artist's albums.48 Once an album is
recorded, an artist is typically required to relinquish all owner-
ship rights in the master recordings49 on the album."0 The
record company is then entitled to sell the album, collect all
proceeds from album sales, and pay the artist, subject to re-
coupment, her share of the proceeds.51
Recording contracts also contain underlying performance
obligations. For example, once an album is recorded and sold,
an artist is entitled to receive her share of royalties for the
duration of copyright protection.52 Thus, the record company
has the continuing obligation to collect and, subject to recoup-
ment, pay the artist. In addition, the record company will like-
ly have the continuing obligation to maintain books and re-
cords relating to the artist's album sales, royalty collection and
5 Id.
, PASSMAN, supra note 2, at 100.
,7 PASSMAN, supra note 2, at 111-12.
4 PASSMAN, supra note 2, at 100, 102.
" A "master recording" is the original recording that is made in a recording
studio. All subsequent copies of the record are made from the master recording.
PASSMAN, supra note 2, at 87-88.
50 PASSMAN, supra note 2, at 89. Typically the rights in the master recordings
will transfer to the record company immediately following creation. SIDNEY
SHEMEL & WILLIAM M. KRASILOVSKY, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC 13 (7th ed. 1995).
51 PASSMAN, supra note 2, at 89. Royalty calculations are based on the suggest-
ed retail list price for album sales in the United States. The actual royalty pay-
able is generally nine to thirteen percent for new artists, fourteen to sixteen per-
cent for mid-level artists, and sixteen to twenty percent for superstars. PASSMAN,
supra note 2, at 109.
"2 SHEMEL, supra note 50, at 13-14.
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royalty payments, as most recording contracts allow an artist
to conduct an audit of the books and records relating to her
account. 3
Similarly, an artist is generally bound, for the duration of
copyright protection in each master recording, by warranties,
representations and indemnifications made in the recording
contract.' The warranties and representations typically in-
clude promises not to perform or record for another record com-
pany, to give all master recordings recorded by the artist to the
record company, and to refrain from rerecording songs without
the record company's consent. In addition, the artist typically
represents that she is not contractually or otherwise prohibited
from performing her obligations under the contract, and that
her written and recorded songs do not infringe on another's
rights.55 If a dispute arises as a result of a breach or alleged
breach of one of these warranties and representations, the
artist is often required to defend the record company and in-
demnify it for any losses."
As a practical matter, the present performance obligations
of a record company and artist are dependent on one another;
the record company cannot sell an artist's albums if the artist
does not record any, and an artist cannot record any albums if
the record company does not pay the requisite monies from the
recording fimd. Failure to perform any of these obligations
would likely constitute a material breach.
Further, even where there are arguably no present perfor-
mance obligations remaining, there are generally continuing
underlying performance obligations remaining that are also
material to the contractual relationship. For example, where
an artist files a bankruptcy petition after she has recorded the
requisite number of songs or albums required during the first
year of the contract, and the record company has paid the
requisite amount of advances and recording costs for that year
but has not yet exercised its option to extend the term of the
contract for another year, there are no present performance
obligations remaining." However, the record company still
SHEMEL, supra note 50, at 21.
SHBMEL, suprm note 50, at 662-66.
SHEMEL, supra note 50, at 662-66.
' SH EL, supra note 50, at 665.
There are no present performance obligations remaining because the record
1997]
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has the obligation to collect and pay royalties, and the artist
still has obligations remaining due to the warranties, represen-
tations and indemnifications made in the contract. These obli-
gations continue into the future, and failure to perform any of
them would likely constitute a material breach. Thus, the
performance remaining by both the record company and the
artist at virtually any point during the relationship between
the artist and record company will likely be sufficient to render
a recording contract executory under any definition."8
2. The Effect of Rejection on Restrictive Covenants is
Unclear and Results in Inequitable Treatment
Assuming a recording contract is deemed executory, it is
subject to rejection under section 365 of the Code. Rejection of"
a contract in bankruptcy constitutes a breach of the contract as
of the date immediately before the bankruptcy petition was
filed, giving rise to remedies for breach of contract in the bank-
ruptcy proceeding.59 The effect of rejection on clauses relating
to present performance obligations is clear-once a contract is
rejected, it is deemed breached and neither party to the con-
tract has any further present performance obligations." Less
clear, however, is the effect of rejection on the underlying per-
formance obligations contained in the contract.
For the non-debtor party to a recording contract, these
provisions, particularly the exclusivity6 and noncompete62
company is not yet obligated to pay more money to the artist and the artist is
not yet obligated to record additional albums for the record company.
" Generally, courts that have addressed the issue of rejection of recording
agreements have found the contracts executory, either implicitly or explicitly. See,
e.g., Ferrell v. Robinson Mann Creative Enters., Inc., 211 B.R. 183, 188 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1997); All Blacks B.V. v. Gruntruck, 199 B.R. 970 (Bankr. W.D. Wash.
1996); In re Taylor, 91 B.R. 302, 310-11 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988); In re Noonan, 17
B.R. 793 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982). Cf In re Monument Record Corp., 61 B.R. 866,
868 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986) (recording contract was not executory because the
parties entered into a "Mutual Release for Termination of Recording Agreement,"
pursuant to which all future rights and performance obligations of the parties
were terminated).
'9 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(g), 101(5) (1996).
go 11 U.S.C. § 365(g).
6 Artists are generally required to promise not to render their personal servic-
es as a recording artist to anyone else during the term of the contract. SHEMEL,
supra note 50, at 664.
62 Artists are generally required to promise not to rerecord their songs for
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provisions, are an extremely valuable aspect of the contractual
relationship. A record company will pay money to an artist in
advance of a finalized album and accordingly, if the artist's al-
bum does not succeed, the record company will lose its invest-
ment. Record companies are generally willing (and able) to
take this risk, in part because of the restrictive covenants con-
tained in the recording agreement. The restrictive covenants
allow a record company to finance a new artist in return for
the artist's promise not to perform for anyone else. That way,
if and when the artist becomes successful, the record company
will be able to reap the benefits of its investment. If an artist
were free to record and perform for any record company at any
time, there would be little incentive for a record company to
initially finance and promote the artist.
Two views regarding the effect of rejection on restrictive
covenants have emerged. One view equates rejection with
cancellation or avoidance, thereby deeming all contractual
provisions, including the restrictive covenants contained in the
contract, breached.' Under another view, only present perfor-
mance obligations are deemed breached, while restrictive cove-
nants survive rejection." Courts that adhere to the first view
of rejection hold that a contract may be rejected or assumed
only in its entirety.' Thus, once a contract is rejected under
section 365 of the Code, both parties to the contract are re-
lieved of all remaining performance obligations, a debtor is free
to enter into another contract despite any restrictive covenants
another company during the term of the contract and for a period of time after
the term of the contract has expired. Id&
' See, e.g., All Blacks, 199 B.R. at 973-75; Silk Plants, Etc. Franchise Sys.,
Inc. v. Register (in re Silk Plants), 100 B.R. 360, 362 (Banhr. MD. Tenn. 1989);
Noonan, 17 B.R. at 798-800; Burger King Corp. v. Rovine Corp. (in re Rovine), 6
B.R. 661, 666 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1980); In re Klaber Bros., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 83,
85 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1959).
"See, e.g., Kopolow v. P.M. Holding Corp. (in re Modern Textile, Inc.), 900
F.2d 1184, 1191-92 (8th Cir. 1990); Ferrell v. Robinson bann Creative Enters.,
Inc., 211 B.R. 183, 189 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997); Fellerman and Cohen Realty Corp.
v. Clinical Plus Inc. (In re Hirshhorn), 156 B.R. 379, 388 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1993);
Cohen v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert
Group Inc.), 138 B.R. 687, 703 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992). In re Don & Lin Trucling
Co., 110 B.R. 562, 566-68 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1990). Although the restrictive cove-
nants will survive, there is no guaranty that the restrictive covenants will be
enforceable. See infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
See Rovine, 6 B.R. at 666; Kaber Bros., 173 F. Supp. at 85.
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contained in the contract, and the non-debtor is entitled to
assert a claim for breach of contract against the bankruptcy
estate.66
This approach to rejection does not provide adequate re-
dress to the non-debtor party to a personal services contract. A
debtor's bankruptcy estate may not have sufficient assets to
fully satisfy all unsecured creditors' claims. To the extent that
there are assets to be distributed, each unsecured creditor is
paid on a pro rata basis with the other unsecured creditors in
its class.67 While this approach may provide some relief to a
non-debtor record company with respect to easily quantifiable
claims, such as the amount of unrecouped advances and re-
cording costs, it will likely not provide adequate relief for
breach of other contractual obligations such as those arising
from restrictive covenants.
If a restrictive covenant is deemed breached in bankrupt-
cy, an actual breach, such as an artist having recorded songs
for another record company, has not yet occurred. Although the
Code specifically gives bankruptcy courts the power to estimate
the amount of such damages,6' any estimate of damages from
a bankruptcy induced breach of a restrictive covenant will
likely be highly speculative and therefore incapable of serving
as a basis for recovery.69 Thus, this approach to rejection may
allow an artist to entirely avoid contractual obligations arising
from restrictive covenants with little or no redress to the non-
debtor party to such contract.
The second approach to rejection attempts to equitably
balance the needs of the debtor and non-debtor parties to per-
sonal services contracts. Under the second approach to rejec-
tion, once a contract is rejected, the debtor is relieved only of
The primary policy consideration governing this approach to rejection is that
rejection is designed to relieve the estate of burdensome executory contracts while
giving the debtor an opportunity to recover financially. See Rouine, 6 B.R. at 666;
Silk Plants, 100 B.R. at 362.
11 U.S.C. § 507 (1996).
68 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (1996).
69 Bankruptcy courts look to state law to determine whether breach of a re-
strictive covenant gives rise to a right to payment in bankruptcy. See, e.g., Grogan
v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 283 (1991); In re Kilpatrick, 160 B.R. 560, 565 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 1993); In re Udell, 149 B.R. 898, 903 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1992). In con-
tract law, any estimate of damages that is too speculative may not be a reason-
able measure of damages. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (1979).
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the present performance obligations contained in the contract
and not of the effects of not fulfilling those obligations.70
Rejection of an executory contract in bankruptcy under this
approach does not mean that the contract never existed. One
court noted that "[t]he most obvious continuing effect of a re-
jected contract is that rejection ordinarily constitutes a breach
of the contract, giving rise to a claim for any resulting damag-
es."' In addition, to allow a contract to be assumed or reject-
ed in its entirety would allow the debtor to " ' have its cake and
eat it too,' by assuming desirable executory contract obligations
while rejecting the burdensome ones."2
The second approach to rejection is likely to provide ade-
quate redress to a non-debtor party as the artist will still be
bound by the underlying performance obligations contained in
the contract, notwithstanding its rejection. In some instances,
however, this approach to rejection may impede a debtor's
right to a "fresh start." In Ferrell v. Robinson Mann Creative
Enterprises, Inc.," ficardo E. Brown, Jr. (professionally
known as "Kurupt"), a chapter 11 debtor, sought to reject sev-
eral executory contracts, including his recording contract with
Death Row Records. In addition, Kurupt sought a declaration
from the court that he was relieved of all obligations under his
contracts.74 When he filed his bankruptcy petition, Kurupt
had assets of over 1.2 million dollars and liabilities of over 20.4
million dollars.7' Because Kurupt was no longer performing
under his contracts, he had no income to pay any of his out-
standing debts.76
The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania permitted Kurupt to reject his contracts, but, using the
second approach to rejection, held that rejection of the con-
tracts "does not necessarily entitle... [Kurupt] to a further
decree that [he is] free to enter into any other contracts; that
"' See In re Don & Lin Trucking Co., 110 B.R. 562, 568 (Bantr. NJ). Ala.
1990).
71 Id. at 567.
7 Id. at 568.
73 211 BR. 183 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997).
7' I& at 185. The decision combined two bankruptcy cases with similar contro-
versies. This Note discusses only the facts and holding of the Ricardo E. Brown,
Jr. bankruptcy.
75 Id. at 187.
76 Id.
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the non-debtor contracting parties have no rights against
[him]; nor that the contracts cannot be specifically enforced
against [him] under applicable state law."77 Although the
court recognized that Kurupt was seeking rejection in order to
be able to bypass the restrictive covenants contained in the
contracts and enter into new contracts, and in fact permitted
rejection in part because Kurupt claimed he was unable to per-
form the contracts and consequently was unable to earn any
money, the court refused to relieve him of his underlying per-
formance obligations under the contract." As discussed above,
the all-or-nothing approach to rejection generally results either
in a failure to provide adequate redress to the non-debtor party
to the contract, or a failure to adequately protect a debtor
seeking a fresh start in bankruptcy.
3. Recent Amendments to the Code Fail to Provide
Sufficient Redress to Non-Debtor Record Companies
In 1988, Congress amended the Code to include additional
protection for licensees of intellectual property.79 Under sec-
tion 365(n), a non-debtor licensee" of intellectual property
now has two options when a debtor seeks contract rejection in
bankruptcy: the non-debtor may choose to either treat the
contract as terminated, or continue with the rejected con-
tract.8 The choices set forth in section 365(n) do not provide
adequate protection for, or adequate redress to, a non-debtor
record company. Although section 365(n) attempts to provide
" Id. at 191. The court conceded that the non-debtor parties to the contracts
may, in fact, not be able to specifically enforce the contracts. However, because
Kurupt had not yet breached his covenant not to compete, the issue was not ripe
for decision. Id. at 191-93.
78 Ferrell, 211 B.R. at 188.
79 Pub. L. No. 100-506, § 2, 102 Stat. 2538 (1988) (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. §§ 101(54), 365(n) (1988)). Intellectual property is defined in the Code as
"trade secret; invention, process, design, or plant protected under title 35; patent
application; plant variety; work of authorship protected under title 17; or mask
work protected under chapter 9 of title 17." 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A) (1996). Musical
compositions and master recordings are considered works of authorship protected
under title 17 and accordingly, fall within the definition of intellectual property in
the Code.
" Section 365(n) is only applicable where the debtor is the licensor of rights
and the non-debtor is the licensee of rights. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1) (1996).8' 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (1996).
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additional protection by giving a non-debtor record company
the option to retain its rights in songs recorded prior to the
bankruptcy, it simultaneously takes away any right to enforce
the restrictive covenants in connection with those pre-petition
songs.
Legislative history" suggests that Congress enacted sec-
tion 365(n) in response to the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.'s
In July 1982, Richmond Metal Finishers ("RMF") granted to
Lubrizol Enterprises ("Lubrizol") the nonexclusive right to use
a patented metal coating process technology in exchange for
the payment of royalties.' One year later, RMF filed a peti-
tion under chapter 11 of the Code and sought to reject its con-
tract with Lubrizol." The Fourth Circuit allowed RMF to re-
ject the contract."6 However, although the contract contained
a provision allowing Lubrizol the continued use of the licensed
technology in the event of a breach by RMZF, the court conclud-
ed that as a result of the rejection, Lubrizol was not entitled to
the continued use of RMF's technology.' Rather, Lubrizol was
entitled to only monetary damages.s The court noted that its
decision could have a "chilling effect" upon the technology in-
dustry, in that companies such as Lubrizol may be unwilling to
contract with businesses that do not have a history of financial
stability. 9 However, because the Code explicitly provided for
the special treatment of collective bargaining agreements"
' See Pub. L. No. 100-506, § 2, 102 Stat. 2538 (1988).
3 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985).
84 Id. at 1045.
' Id- Using the Countryman definition, the court found the contract was execu-
tory-Lubrizol had the continuing obligation to pay royalties and maintain and
deliver quarterly sales reports, and RMF had continuing warranty, indemnity and
notice obligations. Id. at 1045-46.
Id- at 1047.
Id. at 1047-48.
Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048.
I d. o
See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1996). Section 1113 states in pertinent part that-
The court shall approve an application for rejection of a collective bar-
gaining agreement only if the court finds that-(1) the trustee has, prior
to the hearing, made a proposal that fulfills the requirements of subsec-
tion (b)(1); (2) the authorized representative of the employees has refused
to accept such proposal without good cause; and (3) the balance of the
equities clearly favors rejection of such agreement.
11 U.S.C. § 1113(c) (1996).
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and leases of real property,9' but was silent with respect to
the treatment of intellectual property licenses, the court deter-
mined that licensees of intellectual property must "share the
general hazards created by § 365."2 Legislative history sug-
gests that after the Lubrizol decision, Congress added section
365(n) to the Code to protect American technological develop-
ment and to ensure that a debtor could not unilaterally take
away the right of an intellectual property licensee to use the
licensed property by rejecting the license in bankruptcy.93
Under section 365(n), once a contract has been rejected,
the non-debtor party to the contract has the option to either
treat the contract as terminated or to retain its rights under
the contract." If the licensee chooses to treat the contract as
terminated, the licensor will be deemed to be in breach of the
contract as of the date immediately before the case com-
menced. 5 However, section 365(n) does not address or resolve
the uncertainty regarding the affect of rejection on restrictive
covenants. Thus, if a non-debtor record company chooses to
treat the contract as terminated, the record company may not
be adequately protected for its loss.96
If the licensee elects to retain its rights under the rejected
contract, all rights available to the licensee as of the date of
the initial filing, including the right to enforce an exclusivity
provision of the contract, will remain in effect for the duration
of the license.97 This option enables a non-debtor record com-
pany to retain its interest in songs recorded prior to the com-
mencement of the case. 8 However, by choosing to retain its
rights, the licensee waives any claims arising from the perfor-
mance of the contract.99 Thus, if after the record company has
91 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) (1996). "If the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of
real property under which the debtor is the lessor . . . then the lessee . . . may
treat such lease as terminated . . . or . . . the lessee may retain its rights under
such lease . . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1)(A)(i), (ii) (1996).
Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048. o
'3 Pub. L. No. 100-506, § 2, 102 Stat. 2538 (1988).
s' 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (1996).
9' 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(A) (1996).
, See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
9 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(B) (1996).
"8 This enables a record company to recoup the advances and other monies
paid to the artist in connection with the pre-petition songs.
" 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(2)(C)(ii) (1996).
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elected to retain its rights under the contract the record com-
pany receives an infringement claim with respect to the artist's
pre-petition songs, the artist is no longer required to indemnify
the record company for its loss. Section 365(n) essentially forc-
es a record company to choose between relinquishing its rights
to the songs recorded before the bankruptcy petition and
standing in line with all other unsecured creditors to recover
minimal breach of contract damages, or retaining its rights in
the pre-petition songs and losing any future claim it may have
with respect to a breach of the licensor's warranties and repre-
sentations made in the contract. These choices provide neither
adequate protection nor adequate redress to a non-debtor re-
cord company.
II. CURRENTLY AVAILABLE MECHANISMS TO PREVENT
REJECTION ARE INADEQUATE
Once a recording contract is deemed executory and a debt-
or seeks its rejection pursuant to section 365, there is little the
non-debtor party to the contract can do to prevent rejection.
Currently there are two possible ways to prevent rejection: (1)
the non-debtor party may prove that the debtor filed the bank-
ruptcy petition or the motion to reject the executory contract in
bad faith; or (2) the non-debtor party may prove that the
debtor's decision to reject the contract was not made with
sound business judgment. However, neither alternative pro-
vides adequate protection against rejection. The first alterna-
tive is extremely difficult for the non-debtor party to prove
absent very strong evidence, such as an express admission that
the debtor's sole purpose for filing the bankruptcy petition was
to reject the contract and enter into a more profitable one. The
second is, as a practical matter, very difficult to establish due
to the minimal burden required for the debtor to satisfy the
business judgment standard.
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A. It is Difficult for the Non-Debtor Party to Establish Bad
Faith
Certain sections of the Code require evidence of good
faith °0 but there is no literal requirement that a bankruptcy
petition be filed in good faith. Courts have historically imposed
a good faith requirement on filing, however, in order to dismiss
petitions and motions that were contrary to the purpose and
spirit of the Code.'01
Courts have found bad faith where a debtor files a bank-
ruptcy petition with the sole purpose of rejecting an existing
contract in order to enter into a more profitable one.0 2 In In
re Carrere,"'0 a soap opera actress under contract with Amer-
ican Broadcasting Company ("ABC") for her performing servic-
es on the television show "General Hospital" 4 filed a chapter
11 petition and almost immediately sought to reject her con-
tract with ABC so that she could avoid the restrictive cove-
nants contained in the contract and enter into a more lucrative
contract with "A Team."' The bankruptcy court ultimately
denied Carrere's motion to reject the ABC contract because of
Carrere's admission that she filed her petition with the sole
purpose of rejecting her ABC contract.0 6 The court recog-
nized that "[i]t would be inequitable to allow a greedy debtor to
seek the equitable protection of [bankruptcy] when her major
1" See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(3), 1325(a)(3) (1996) (a plan under chapters 11
and 13 must be proposed in good faith).
101 See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission v. United States Realty &
Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 455 (1940); In re Chinichian v. Campolongo, 784
F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986); In re Southern California Sound Sys., Inc., 69 B.R. 893
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1987); In re Carrere, 64 B.R. 156 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986); In re
Talladega Steaks, Inc., 50 B.R. 42 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1985). See supra notes 15-19
and accompanying text for a discussion of the purpose of bankruptcy protection.
" See, e.g., Chinichian, 784 F.2d at 1444-46; Shell Oil Co. v. Waldron (In re
Edward Waldron), 785 F.2d 936, 939-41 (11th Cir. 1986); Carrere, 64 B.R. at 159-
60.
10 64 B.R. 156 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986).
'' Id. at 157.
1" Id. While under contract with ABC, Carrere made a guest appearance on
the show "A Team" and was then offered a long-term contract to become a regular
on the show for considerably more money than she would make under her con-
tract with ABC. Id.
10 Id. Carrere admitted that she only entered bankruptcy when her attorney
advised that she would be able to reject her ABC contract in bankruptcy. Id.
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motivation is to cut off the equitable remedies of her employ-
er."10 7 However, absent a direct admission by the debtor, a
non-debtor will almost certainly be unable to establish that a
debtor's sole motivation for filing is to be able to enter into a
more profitable contract.
A filing that is solely motivated by the prospect of reject-
ing an executory contract, however, will not necessarily be
found to constitute bad faith.' If, by continuing the perfor-
mance of an executory contract, the debtor will substantially
increase her debt or make her debt overly burdensome to the
estate, contract rejection may be in the best interest of the es-
tate0 9 and accordingly, a court will likely not find bad faith,
even if rejection of the contract is the debtor's sole motiva-
tion.110
Typically courts look to the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the filing, including the debtor's finances and
motivations for filing, to determine whether a petition was
filed in good faith."' In Little Creek Development Co. v. Com-
monwealth Mortgage Corp.," the Fifth Circuit enumerated
certain factors that, when present, provide strong indicia of
bad faith: (1) the debtor has one asset that is encumbered by
secured creditors' liens; (2) the debtor's only employees are the
principals; (3) there is little or no cash flow in the debtor's
business; (4) there are no apparent sources of income to sus-
tain a plan of reorganization; (5) there are only a few unse-
" Id. at 160. The court first decided that the right to reject or assume an
executory contract does not apply to personal services contracts because they are
not property of the estate. Id at 158-59. See supra note 37.
" See, eg., All Blacks B.V. v. Gruntruck, 199 B.R. 970 (Bankr. W.D. Wash.
1996); In re W. & L. Assocs., Inc., 71 B.R. 962 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987); In re
Bofill, 25 B.R. 550 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
" A court will only permit rejection if the decision to reject is based on sound
business judgment. See infra notes 115-22 and accompanying text. If rejection will
be a burden on the estate, presumably the decision to reject will not have been
made with sound business judgment.
110 For example, in In re Continental Airlines Corp., Continental Airlines sought
to reject its collective bargaining agreement after it filed a petition for relief under
chapter 11. Despite Continentals clear expectation to be able to reject its contract,
the bankruptcy court refused to find bad faith as Continental had other valid
reasons for seeking bankruptcy protection, namely, to keep the airline flying. In re
Continental Airlines Corp., 38 B.R. 67, 71-72 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1984).
. See Little Creek Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 779 F.2d 1068,
1072 (5th Cir. 1986); In re Gucci, 32 C.B.C.2d 191 (Banlrr. S.D.N.Y. 1994).
12 779 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1986).
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cured creditors who hold only small claims against the debtor;
and (6) the debtor's property has been posted for foreclosure
and the debtor has been unsuccessful in lifting the foreclosure
in state court."' This list of indicia may assist courts in rec-
ognizing bad faith filings, but the list is not exhaustive and,
more importantly, cannot be used to definitively determine bad
faith."4 A debtor may satisfy many of the above criteria for a
bad faith filing but may still legitimately need the protection of
the bankruptcy courts.
B. A Court Generally Will Find a Debtor's Decision to Reject
an Executory Contract Satisfies the Business Judgment
Standard
If a debtor has not filed her petition or sought to reject her
contract in bad faith, the court must then determine whether
rejection is appropriate. 5 The Code offers no guidance, 16
but courts will generally find a decision to reject an executory
contract appropriate where it is based on sound business judg-
ment."
7
The business judgment standard is easy for a debtor to
meet."' To satisfy this standard, a debtor need show only
that rejection of the contract will likely benefit the estate."'
113 Id. at 1072-73.
. Id. at 1072 ("Determining whether the debtor's filing for relief is in good
faith depends largely upon the bankruptcy court's on-the-spot evaluation of the
debtor's financial condition, motives, and the local financial realities."). See also In
re Newark Airport/Hotel Ltd. Partnership, 156 B.R. 444, 448 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1993).
.15 This applies only to cases under chapters 9, 11, 12 and 13. In a case under
chapter 7, if an executory contract is not assumed within sixty days, the contract
is deemed rejected. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1) (1996). This automatic rejection right is
another problem inherent in the Code relating to personal services contracts, but
is beyond the scope of this Note.
1l6 The Code offers no guidelines with which a court must base its decision to
allow rejection; rejection is merely "subject to the court's approval." 11. U.S.C.
§ 365(a) (1996).
"" See, e.g., Ferrell v. Robinson Mann Creative Enters., Inc., 211 B.R. 183
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997); In re W. & L. Assocs., Inc., 71 B.R. 962 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1987).
.18 See, e.g., Ferrell, 211 B.R. at 188 (there is a "low threshold necessary" to
show the decision to reject was made with sound business judgment); In re III En-
ters. Inc., 163 B.R. 453, 469 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) ("sound business judgment [is]
a standard which we have concluded many times is not difficult to meet.").
11 W. & L. Assocs., 71 B.R. at 966. See also NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465
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In addition, courts generally will not interfere with a debtor's
business decision unless "the decision [to reject] is so unreason-
able that it could not be based on sound business judgment,
but only on bad faith or whim."' As shown in Ferrell," a
recording artist may easily demonstrate that rejection will
likely benefit the estate by simply refusing to perform under
the contract.m
The difficulties in proving a debtor acted in bad faith cou-
pled with the great deference given to debtors' decisions to
reject contracts in bankruptcy severely restricts the ability of
the non-debtor party to an executory recording agreement to
prevent rejection. Moreover, the current rules relating to exec-
utory contracts in bankruptcy may provide inadequate redress
to the non-debtor record company, inadequate protection to the
debtor artist, or both. These inequitable results demonstrate
there is a need for an equitable standard to govern the treat-
ment of executory personal services contracts under section
365 of the Code.
U.S. 513; Robertson v. Pierce (In re Chi-Feng Huang), 23 B.R 798, 800 (9th Cir.
1982); Ferrell, 211 B.R. at 188; Johnson v. Fairco Corp., 61 B.R. 317, 320 (Bankr.
N.D. II 1986).
Ferrell, 211 B.R. at 188 (citing In re Hardie, 100 BIL 284, 287 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. 1989)). In In re W. & L Assoc., Inc., the Banlmptcy Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania allowed the debtor in po~ession to reject an
agreement of sale of realty even though the court admitted it had reservations
about the debtor's motives. W. & L. Assocs., 71 B.R. at 968. The court sugge3ted
that the only way it would refuse a debtor's request to reject a contract was if
there was "some element of insider profit at the expense of the estate ... or
valid disinterested creditor opposition," but then stated "we do not consider it our
function to second-guess the Debtor's counsel concerning the po3sible benefits to be
attained by the Debtor in this case." Id. at 967. See also Bildisco, 465 US. at
523; Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, 756 F.2d 1043, 1045;
Control Data Corp. v. Zelman (In re inges), 602 F.2d 38, 43-44 (2d Cir. 1979);
Sundial Asphalt Co., Inc. v. V.P.C. Investors Corp. (In re Sundial Asphalt Inc.),
147 B.R. 72, 81-84 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Chipwich, Inc., 54 B.R. 427, 430-
31 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
211 B.R. 183 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1997).
See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
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III. AN EQUITABLE STANDARD TO DETERMINE WHEN REJECTION
OF EXECUTORY PERSONAL SERVICES CONTRACTS IS
APPROPRIATE
As the preceding analysis illustrates, absent highly proba-
tive evidence of bad faith, a debtor 'party to an executory per-
sonal services contract will nearly always be able to reject her
contract in bankruptcy, thus avoiding her unperformed con-
tractual obligations. Moreover, the non-debtor party to the
contract will be left, as a practical matter, with no remedy. The
ready availability of personal services contract rejection under
current bankruptcy laws creates an incentive for successful
recording artists to seek bankruptcy protection to avoid con-
tractual obligations to which they willingly agreed at the start
of their careers. In many instances, those seeking protection
may live the lavish lifestyle of up and coming superstars. Fur-
ther, the debtor's stardom may be due in large part to the
effort and investment of the non-debtor party to the contract
sought to be rejected. The incentives generated and the gross
inequities which may result under the current Code can be
corrected through the adoption of an undue hardship standard.
This would ensure that the debtor is given an adequate fresh
start free from burdensome debt and creditor harassment. 3
while balancing the interests among the debtor and non-debtor
parties to the executory personal services contract. An executo-
ry personal services contract should be rejected only where,
after consideration of the equities among the debtor and non-
12 Current bankruptcy laws do not afford a debtor an absolute fresh start in
all situations. Certain types of debt, such as alimony, child support payments, and
student loans, generally are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5),
(8) (1996). Alimony and child support payments are dischargeable only if incurred
as a result of a divorce decree, a separation agreement or a court order, and stu-
dent loans are not dischargeable unless the bankruptcy petition is filed at least
seven years after the first payment on the loan was due. However, the Code pro-
vides an exception-where a student debtor can show that the debt would cause
an undue hardship on her and her dependents, the student loans may be dis-
charged. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(B) (1996). These rules regarding non-dischargeable
debts are not contrary to the purpose of the Code. In these situations, the debtor
is still getting a fresh start-her assets will still be liquidated under chapter 7 or
her business may still go through a reorganization under chapter 11, and she will
be free of most debt and creditor harassment. The only difference is that the debt-
or is given a "mostly" fresh start instead of an "absolute" fresh start.
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debtor parties to such contract, the continued performance by
the debtor would create an undue hardship for the debtor.
In order to determine undue hardship, bankruptcy courts
need to compare the debtor's post-petition financial well-being
if the executory contract is rejected, to her financial well-being
if the contract remains in effect. If the difference is inconse-
quential, rejection should not be permitted. Rejection in that
instance would not promote a primary interest of the Code as
the debtor's post-bankruptcy financial situation is the same
with or without rejection. In addition, rejection would under-
mine the non-debtor party's reasonable expectation that the
contract would be fulfilled and would take away virtually any
chance of an adequate remedy for breach of contract. If, howev-
er, the court finds that there is a difference in the debtor's
post-bankruptcy financial well-being, the court must examine
the nature and extent of the difference in order to equitably
balance the interests of the parties involved. Where the differ-
ence is great, rejection is more likely proper to provide enough
of a fresh start to the debtor. Where the difference is small, the
court should be less willing to allow rejection.
The court should first look to the nature and extent of the
relationship between the debtor and non-debtor party to the
contract, including the obligations of the parties under the
contract and the investments made by each party prior to the
bankruptcy filing. The more time, money and effort a non-
debtor party has invested in the contract, the more inequitable
it would be to end the contract prematurely. The court should
also examine the circumstances surrounding the bankruptcy
filing. For example, a near superstar recording artist may have
been living a lavish lifestyle that was not affordable under her
existing contract, and as a result of her thriftless spending, she
acquired a substantial amount of debt. If her recording con-
tract is in line with industry custom, the court should deter-
mine whether requiring her to reduce her spending is more
equitable than allowing her to reject her contract, enter into a
new contract, and allowing her to maintain her lifestyle-or at
least have a standard of living higher than that which she
could afford under the existing contract. In its evaluation the
court should also consider the extent of good faith negotiations
between the parties prior to the filing of the bankruptcy peti-
1997]
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tion and the willingness of the parties to make post-petition
concessions and modifications to the contract.
The list of considerations described above to determine
whether contract rejection is appropriate is not exhaustive.
The specific factors to be considered and the weight to be given
to each needs to be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking
into consideration the facts and equities of each situation.
However, the Code should be amended to require that courts
perform an undue hardship evaluation whenever rejection of
an executory personal services contract under section 365 is
requested.
Executory personal services contracts should be included
in the Code's list of exceptions to discharge unless the contin-
ued performance would cause an undue hardship on the debt-
or. The current rules relating to rejection of executory con-
tracts are inequitable, resulting in either a failure to adequate-
ly protect the debtor, a failure to provide adequate redress to
the non-debtor party to the contract, or both. The adoption of
an undue hardship standard to determine whether rejection is
appropriate will give bankruptcy courts the freedom and the
means to determine the most equitable balance between all
parties involved.24
CONCLUSION
Under the current bankruptcy laws there is insufficient
protection against rejection for the non-debtor party to an
executory personal services contract. Absent a flagrant show-
ing of bad faith, there is no alternative to rejection. Often,
either the non-debtor party to a rejected executory personal
services contract has no adequate remedy, or the debtor party
to such contract does not receive a sufficiently fresh start.
Moreover, the current bankruptcy laws create an incentive for
performers to seek or threaten to seek bankruptcy protection to
avoid unperformed contractual obligations without risking
significant damages for breach of contract.
124 Bankruptcy courts are well-suited to balance equities. Congress has indicated
its belief in the competence of bankruptcy courts to balance equities when consid-
ering rejection of collective bargaining agreements. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(C) (1996).
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The introduction of an undue hardship standard in deter-
mining whether to permit rejection of personal services con-
tracts serves the dual purpose of extending relief to the debtor
when necessary, while preserving the reasonable expectations
of both parties when they entered into the contract. An undue
hardship standard will discourage bad faith filings and will
prevent abuse of the bankruptcy courts. Furthermore, such a
standard will maintain the equitable balance between parties
to executory personal services contracts, and will preserve the
underlying purpose of bankruptcy protection without unduly
disrupting settled commercial expectations.
Alison J. Winick

